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In this paper, I investigate employment behaviour of women one year after 
childbirth. Since the study is based on a sample of mothers only, a corrective 
method for selection into motherhood has been applied. In the empirical work, 
I use the family sex composition as an instrument for fertility. The primary 
focus of this study is to investigate the regional differences in the labour supply 
of women after childbirth. In Switzerland, childcare policy is an area being the 
responsibility  of  cantons  and  communes.  There  are  thus  considerable 
geographical, linguistic and cultural differences in childcare provision within 
the country. For instance, childcare policy is more strongly integrated at the 
cantonal level in the French and Italian speaking regions (“Latin part”) than in 
the  German  speaking  regions  (“German  part”)  where  communes  operate  at 
their own discretion. The federal structure of Switzerland poses thus issues of 
policy coherence. The main results of this paper indicate that Latin mothers are 
more  likely  to  return  to  work  and  to  report  more  hours  of  work than  their 
German  counterparts.  As  a  consequence,  a  more  coherent  and  more 
harmonised  childcare  policy  at  the  federal  level  should  prove  worthwhile. 
Adopting measures that increase the availability and the quality of childcare is 
important to promote mother’s full-time and continuous employment.  
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1  Introduction   
 
 
In Switzerland, the issue of families has been of policy concern since the 1990s. The 
social and economic changes that the country experienced during the last decades generated 
indeed an increasing poverty among families. In addition, mothers who are generally well-
educated still experience large difficulties of integration to the job market. In this context, 
family policy has a crucial role, since one of its objectives is to ensure adequate resources for 
families. Second, a family policy that helps to balance family and work would facilitate full-
time  and  continuous  employment  of  mothers.  Lastly,  it  would  improve  both  fertility  and 
female labour supply, which would also help facing the challenges of an ageing population 
(OECD, 2004a and b).  
 
The  focus  of  this  paper  is  the  work  attachment  of  women  after  childbirth.  The 
objective  is  to  investigate  to  what  extent  having  children  and  participating  to  the  labour 
market are compatible decisions for women in Switzerland. This question has already been 
addressed in the empirical literature about female labour supply. Many empirical studies find 
evidence that childcare is intensively time demanding and that childcare costs tend to reduce 
the mother’s labour supply (see for instance Heckman, 1974; Blau and Robins, 1988; and 
Connelly  and  Kimmel,  2003).  In  these  studies,  a  recurrent  problem  is  the  modelling  of 
childcare costs. Some studies combine information from household surveys and surveys of 
childcare providers in order to capture variations in the price-quality packages of childcare 
services. Other studies have only data from household surveys and the prices are reported by 
parents who choose among providers offering different level of prices and quality (which is 
usually unobservable). In this case, the endogeneity in childcare costs has been addressed by 
using instrumental variables such as regional variations in childcare expenditures (in order to 
measure price and quality changes).  
 
Another strand of empirical literature on female labour supply considers the presence 
of  children  as  an  exogenous  variable  in  the  labour  supply  equation.  Killingsworth  and 
Heckman (1986) provide an excellent survey of work in this area. A consistent finding in 
these empirical studies is the negative effect of the number of children on hours of work. 
However, it is difficult to say anything about causality, because women who may have strong 
preferences on making career would be less prone to be mothers than those women who have   4 
preferences for family activities. This selectivity problem makes the fertility variables in the 
labour  supply  endogenous.  Some  studies  have  solved  this  endogeneity  problem  by  using 
instrumental variables. The major difficulty resides in finding instruments that are not weak 
i.e.  finding  variables  that  are  not  correlated  with  the  labour  supply  but  that  are  highly 
correlated with the fertility decision. As an illustration, membership of the Catholic faith is no 
longer  a  valid  instrument,  since  the  use  of  contraceptive  methods  has  increased  among 
Catholic women. A good candidate is the occurrence of twins-pairs. But, this corresponds to a 
rather rare event, except if the dataset is sufficiently large.  
 
In this paper, I investigate the labour supply of women one year after childbirth. I take 
into account the selection into motherhood by specifying a joint model for the fertility and 
employment decisions. To my knowledge, currently, there is no empirical study that examines 
this question of endogeneity of fertility in labour supply for Switzerland. In this study, I use 
the sex of previous children as an instrument for fertility. Then, the model is estimated by 
maximising the likelihood function obtained through the joint specification of fertility and 
employment. 
 
Besides these methodological considerations, it is interesting, from a policy point of 
view, to focus on the Swiss case, since Switzerland does not have a, so called, “nationwide 
family  policy”.  Due  to  its  federal  structure,  cantons  and  communes  are  responsible  for 
measures in this area. This results in large disparities between regions, especially in childcare 
provision. In this work, I investigate whether the labour force attachment of mothers living in 
the Latin region is similar to that for mothers living in the German region. The Latin region is 
characterised by a rather interventionist political tradition: the state intervenes in the balance 
between family and work. On the contrary, the political tradition in the German region is 
more liberal: individuals take the decisions in this area and thus the state does not intervene. If 
regional differences arise in mother’s labour supply, then they are attributed to the different 
implementation of intervention measures helping the reconciliation between family and work. 
This would shed some light on the question of the necessity of promoting childcare services at 
the federal level and of increasing the  role of the state in the family policy, because the 
provision of formal childcare services is generally insufficient in Switzerland.  
 
Turning  to  employment decision,  I  distinguish  between  non-participation,  full-time 
employment and part-time employment. Empirical evidence (see for instance Nakamura and   5 
Nakamura, 1983; and Blank, 1989) has confirmed the importance of distinguishing between 
part-time and full-time work. Currently, in Switzerland, the only way of combining work and 
family  for  women  is  to  work  part-time.  Indeed,  one  in  two  women  work  part-time.  In 
addition, situations such that mothers work less than half-time often arise. That is why  I 
consider two distinct states for part-time employment.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the existing 
literature on labour supply and fertility. Section 3 presents some stylised facts about family 
policy in Switzerland. In Section 4, some descriptive statistics about fertility and employment 
are  reported.  Section  4  also  looks  at  the  data  which  are  used  in  estimation  of  the 
econometrical model that is presented in Section 5. Then, Section 6 presents the estimation 
results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2  Review of literature on labour supply and fertility    
 
 
In literature, the relationship between fertility and female labour market participation 
(resp. labour supply) has been largely discussed. There is empirical evidence that labour force 
attachment  of  women  is  negatively  correlated  with  the  number  of  children,  whereas  this 
correlation reverses and turns to be positive as children are older (see for instance Heckman 
and Walker, 1990; Gangadharan and Rosenbloom, 1996). In fact, the theory of time allocation 
within family (Becker, 1965 and Willis, 1973) predicts that childcare costs reduce female 
participation and labour supply. The hypothesis is that childbearing is time demanding and 
acts  thus  as  opportunity  costs:  the  higher  are  the  wages,  the  higher  are  the  costs  of 
childbearing.  Thus,  this  will  reduce  the  demand  for  children.  This  behaviour  has  been 
widespread over the past decades in the European countries such as France, Germany and 
Italy. A substantial increase of female participation on the labour market has indeed been 
observed. In line with this increase, fertility rates have declined rapidly. This also holds for 
Switzerland. 
 
However,  since  the  late  1980s,  it  appears  that  the  negative  relationship  between 
fertility and participation has reversed with a tendency to observe a positive association. For 
instance,  France  and  Netherlands  are  countries  that  experience  both  high  fertility  and 
participation rates (OECD, 2001). On the contrary, Germany, Italy and Spain have low levels   6 
of fertility and participation. Different factors may explain this positive association. First, the 
continuous  increase  of  unemployment  since  the  beginning  of  the  1990s  may  favour  the 
decision of women to participate in the labour market in order to maintain the family income 
if the partner becomes unemployed (cf. the added-worker hypothesis, see for instance Filler et 
al,  1996).  Second,  the  development  of  childcare  infrastructure  is  an  important  factor 
describing this positive relationship (see for instance the studies by Hotz et al, 1997 and by 
Ahn and Mira, 2002). Moreover, Apps and Rees (2001) show that the OECD countries that 
provide childcare related services are likely to have both higher female labour supply and a 
higher fertility rate. 
 
The issue of childcare and state assistance with childcare expenditures has motivated a 
large number of empirical studies. For the US, the studies by Heckman (1974), Blau and 
Robbins  (1988),  Connelly  and  Kimmel  (2003)  demonstrate  that  the  availability  and  the 
quality of childcare are important to facilitate women’s full-time and continuous employment. 
Similarly, Gustafsson and Stafford (1992) estimate the effect of childcare costs on labour 
force  participation  for  women  in  Sweden;  and  Powell  (1998)  analyses  how  childcare 
expenditures affect employment behaviour of married women in Canada. For the European 
countries, Joshi and Davies (1992) show that mothers of 2 children lose on average 10 years 
of  employment  in  Germany  compared  to  their  counterparts  without  children.  This  loss 
amounts to 8 years in UK, to 2 in Sweden and to zero in France. The full day infant schools 
("écoles maternelles") which are free and universally available to all children from the age of 
3 and which run 8 hours per day could explain the latter result for France.  
 
In  the  empirical  literature,  a  growing  attention  has  been  paid  to  labour  supply  of 
married women (see for instance the survey by Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986). The main 
focus concerned the sign of the labour supply response to changes in the level of unearned 
income (husband’s income) and to changes in the marginal wage rate. In general, it turns out 
that women work less as their husbands’ income rises. Similarly, the highly paid women tend 
to delay birth and to supply more hours. In addition, a consistent result in empirical studies of 
female labour supply concerns the influence of the number and age distribution of children on 
hours of work (see Mincer, 1962; Cain, 1966; Heckman, 1974 and Schultz, 1978). The labour 
supply is negatively influenced by the number of children and positively influenced by the 
age of children. 
   7 
Most of empirical studies on female labour supply consider the variable capturing the 
presence of children as exogenous in the employment decision. This is restrictive since the 
fertility and labour supply decisions can be considered to be a joint decision process. As a 
consequence,  it  is  not  so  clear  whether  more  children  “cause”  women  to  work  less.  In 
addition,  it  is  possible  that  for  some  unknown  reasons,  some  women  who  have  strong 
preferences  for  work  activity  are  less  prone  to  be  mothers  than  those  who  have  a  lower 
attachment to the labour force. The technique of instrumental variables can get round this 
problem. Several studies have used instrumental variables to check for the endogeneity of 
fertility variables (see the survey by Browning (1992) which gives a comprehensive overview 
of work in this area). The majority of these studies find some evidence that children variables 
are endogenous in the female labour supply. The main problem in estimating the causal effect 
of  fertility  on  female  labour  supply  is  to  find  suitable  variables  which  fulfil  the  joint 
requirements of being exogeneous and having as much explanatory power as possible. Some 
variables such as birth of twins are difficult to use except in large data sets, because they refer 
to very rare events. Other variables such as religion and mother’s opinion on ideal family size 
are  probably  related  to  labour  market  behaviour  via  other  effects  than  fertility.  Recently, 
Angrist and Evans (1998) and Carrasco (2001) have used the sex of the first two children as 
an instrument for fertility. This instrument exploits the result obtained in the demography 
literature on parent’s preferences over the sex composition of their children. There is indeed a 
consensus  that  parents  in  developed  countries  prefer  a  mixed  sibling-sex  composition, 
although these preferences vary between cultures and within the same culture over time (see 
for instance the empirical studies by Westoff et al. 1963; Ben-Porath and Welch, 1976 and 
Williamson, 1983).  
 
  The last point of this section presents a brief overview of the empirical studies about 
fertility and female labour supply in Switzerland. To my knowledge, there is no empirical 
study for Switzerland investigating the issues of fertility and labour supply simultaneously. 
The existing applications for the Swiss case focus on one particular aspect of female labour 
supply.  For  instance,  Gerfin  (1992)  and  Kolodziejczyk  (2003)  investigate  the  impact  of 
progressive income tax on female labour supply. Using a life-cycle model, Kolodziejczyk 
(2003) finds that progressive taxation has negative incentives for female labour supply. Gerfin 
(1992) finds that restrictions on hours cause much higher welfare losses than the tax system. 
Other empirical studies by Gerfin (1993) and Bauer (1998) find results on the effect of family 
structure on female labour supply. The number of children and the presence of young children   8 
have a negative effect similar to that found in the existing literature on female labour supply. 
Finally, the recent study by Gerfin and Leu (2003) explores another feature of labour supply. 
The primary focus of this study is on the low income working households. In their work, 
Gerfin and Leu provide a micro-simulation of the effects of introducing different schemes of 
in-work benefits on poverty and household labour supply. Another strand of literature which 
is directly related to the presence of children in families concerns the differences between 
men and women in labour market outcomes. Gender wage gaps have been widely studied in 
Switzerland (see for instance Kugler, 1988; Bonjour, 1997; Henneberger and Sousa-Poza, 
1999  and  Sousa-Poza,  2002).  Using  different  data  sets,  these  studies  lead  to  the  robust 
conclusion that persistent wage gaps (of at least 20%) are observed between men and women.   
 
This paper sheds some lights on the labour supply of women one year after childbirth. 
In this empirical study, I explicitly model the employment decision simultaneously with the 
decision to give birth, following the approach of Hotz and Miller (1988). The determinants of 
labour supply are analysed for the sample of mothers, after correcting for selectivity into 
motherhood.  Another  contribution  is  that  regional  differences  are  accounted  for.  This  is 
important since there is no federal family policy, but cantons and communes are competent in 
this domain. The regional differences that result in the labour force attachment of mothers one 
year after childbirth may lead to important policy conclusions. In fact, the analysis of the 
cantonal (regional) family policy and the employment behaviour of mothers after childbirth 
can reveal whether one region performs better than another and thus whether it is useful or not 
to introduce a family/childcare policy at the federal level.  
 
 
3  Some Swiss institutional facts about family policy 
 
 
3.1. Policy responsibility in Switzerland 
 
Switzerland  is  not  a  centralised  country  but  a  confederation  of  26  relatively 
independent cantons. The traditional federal policy is not to intervene in the decision making 
process of families with young children, since decisions in this area are considered to be a 
private matter: parents themselves should decide how they wish to balance their work and 
care responsibilities. Thus, the first important fact about Swiss family policy is that there is no 
global  concept  at  the  federal  level.  According  to  Article  116,  para.1  of  the  Federal   9 
Constitution, “the Confederation must consider the needs of the family when it fulfils its 
tasks”. In other words, family policy is not a sector in itself as education or health. Then, the 
Constitution  defines  “family”  in  its  widest  sense.  Family  is  a  “community  of  adults  and 
children” and “the right to marriage and the right to have a family” is guaranteed. There is an 
area of conflict between promoting each individual family member and promoting family as a 
unit. There is no clear guidelines in the Constitution on the direction family policy should 
take. The Confederation has both individual and institution centred policies. In general, the 
traditional  family  model  applies  where  tasks  of  men  and  women  are  clearly  defined  and 
divided. 
 
The  Swiss  political  system  is  characterised  by  two  fundamental  related  principles: 
“federalism”  and  “subsidiarity”.  The  federal  structure  means  that  the  Confederation  has 
competence only where it is empowered under the federal constitution. In all other cases, the 
cantons  are  responsible  when  the  competence  of  the  Confederation  is  not  explicitly 
mentioned.  In  addition  to  the  cantons,  which  are  the  main  interlocutors  of  the  federal 
authorities,  municipalities  play  a  central  role  in  this  decentralised  system.  The  federal 
structure implies thus that family policy is the responsibility of cantons and communes. On 
the other hand, the principle of subsidiary implementation takes place for tasks that need 
harmonisation at the federal level, and for which cantons cannot achieve the completion on 
their own. As a consequence, the federal structure raises issues of policy coherence, especially 
if different administrative levels follow different policy objectives on the same issue. It also 
raises questions of efficient use of resources and of equal treatment. 
 
3.2. Measures and interventions in family policy 
 
Different intervention areas characterise family policy in Switzerland. First, economic 
interventions  cover  family  allowances,  family  taxation  and  means-tested  family  benefits. 
Second,  socio-institutional  interventions  cover  childcare  outside  the  family  and  activities 
aimed at making professional life more family-friendly (Report on families, 2004). Cantonal 
family  policy  is  centred  on  the  economic  intervention  level.  All  cantons  in  Switzerland 
provide, in one form or another, family or child benefits, family-oriented tax exemptions, 
means-tested family support and other material benefits such as educational grants. Although 
the principles governing these economic benefits are similar across the cantons, there are 
often differences in the levels and rates applied. In terms of socio-institutional interventions,   10 
there  are  substantial  cantonal  differences.  Generally,  the  number  of  outside  childcare 
organisations is very small. However, the cantonal differences observed are explained by the 
communes which are the principal actor of childcare policy, through the provision of outside 
childcare, crèches, kindergartens and after-school clubs. 
 
The  following  section  gives  an  overview  of  measures  and  interventions  in  family 
policy.  A  substantial  determinant  of  family  policy  is  the  tax  system.  In  Switzerland,  the 
taxation  is  based  on  the  principle  that  family  represents  an  economic  unit.  Due  to  the 
progressive rates applied, this system of common taxation may lead to disincentive effects for 
married women to enter the labour market. Fiscal deductions and family/children benefits can 
mitigate  these  effects.  However,  in  Switzerland,  there  is  no  "Swiss"  tax  system,  but  26 
different cantonal tax systems. In addition, the 2900 communes may levy taxes as multiples of 
the  cantonal  basic  rate.  Fiscal  deductions  for  children  vary  considerably  across  cantons: 
12600 CHF per child in 2003 in Ticino (TI), 6500 CHF in Geneva (GE) and 3200 CHF in 
Graubünden (GR).
1 In addition, childcare expenditures are deductible in 11 cantons, but the 
conditions are rather restrictive (see Gerfin and Leu, 2003).  
 
In addition to the tax system, children benefits paid to parents for bearing and rearing 
their  children  is  an  important  part  of  family  transfers.  Although  the  Confederation  has 
constitutional competencies in this domain, family benefits have not yet been harmonised at 
the federal level. There is indeed a federal law for parents working in agricultural sector only. 
For the other economic sectors, family benefits are ruled at the cantonal level. In 2004, they 
amount  on  average  to  180  CHF  (per  child  and  per  month).  Figure  1  indicates  that  high 
cantonal differences are observed: with 150 CHF in Aargau (AG) against 260 CHF in Valais 
(VS) for the first two children and with 150 CHF in AG against 320 CHF in Vaud (VD) and 
344 CHF in VS from the third child. Moreover, the payment is conditional on the labour 
market  status  of  the  parents:  most  cantons  require  full-time  employment  for  parents  as 
eligibility  criteria.  In  addition,  the  amount  of  benefits  is  relative  small  compared  to  the 
effective costs of rearing children.
2 
 
                                                 
1 The average deduction at the national level in 2003 amounts to 5600 CHF per child (according to the Federal 
Tax Administration Documentary Service, 2003).  
2 According to Swiss family organisations, children benefits do not cover all expenses implied by the presence of 
children, including food, clothing, furniture’s, bigger housing and education.   11 
 
In  terms  of  family  leave  policies,  Switzerland  is  lagging  behind  the  other  OECD 
countries (OECD, 2001). Although planned in the Federal Constitution of 1959, there is still 
no  maternity  insurance  in  Switzerland.  At  the  federal  level,  protection  of  pregnancy  and 
maternity is regulated in different federal laws which are not well coordinated. For instance, 
the Federal Law on Work of 1964 guarantees an employment protection during the pregnancy 
and the 16 weeks following childbirth. It further stipulates the right for women to not work 
during the 8 weeks following childbirth. However, it is still possible, with agreement of the 
pregnant woman, to shorten this leave to 6 weeks. Furthermore, the employer has to pay a 
salary during 3 weeks after childbirth (this duration increases with seniority in the firm). As a 
consequence, situations such that the salary is only paid during a part of the leave often arise. 
This is the most important legal gap. Since 1945, all attempts aimed at instituting a federal 
maternity  insurance  have  been  rejected  in  referenda.  GE  is  the  only  canton  which  has 
introduced a cantonal law on maternity insurance for working women (enacted in 2000). The 
canton of VD prepares for doing the same. The lack of legislation in this domain is partially 
covered by social assistance allowances. In fact, twelve cantons (ZH, LU, GL, ZG, FR, SH, 
SG, GR, AG, TI, VD and NE) provide help to poor families including pregnant women.
3 This 
help is characterised by (mean-tested) benefits paid according to need. In this domain, TI 
remains a pioneer, because the entitlement period for these benefits is much longer than in 
other  cantons.  In  addition  to  children  benefits  and  educational  grants  (independently  of 
                                                 
3 See Table 1 for a list of abbreviations of the name of the cantons.   12 
income), the “modèle tessinois” provides a mean-tested benefit paid to children until the age 
of 15 and an allowance paid to very young children until the age of 3. 
 
  Besides  the  economic  measures,  childcare  related  services  are  another  important 
feature  of  family  policy.  In  Switzerland,  it  is  difficult  to  record  the  different  childcare 
institutions that operate outside the family.  In fact, there is no definition and no uniform 
structure for crèches, nurseries, kindergartens and after-school care. Moreover, it is difficult to 
obtain statistics at the cantonal level, such that the comparison between cantons is possible. In 
spite of these difficulties, the lack of formal childcare arrangements is striking in Switzerland. 
For instance, in 2000, 50’000 childcare places are available for about 560’000 children aged 
under 6 in 2000 (i.e. less than 1 place for 11 children).
4 Moreover, demand exceeds supply 
such that many parents have to wait for 2 years before placing their child in a nursery. In this 
area,  the  Federal  Department  of  Home  Affairs  has  published  a  report  on  families  in 
Switzerland in 2004. This report indicates that about one third of households with children 
use childcare services outside the family. In addition, 60% of these families use these services 
for at most one day per week. In half of families, grand-parents look for children while day-
care lasts a very few hours. In case of higher needs, parents turn to childcare institutions. 
Furthermore, the report sheds some light on the cantonal variability in childcare services. GE 
is the Swiss canton that has the highest supply of services (crèches and nurseries) per 1000 
children under 7 (see Table 1). On the contrary, the density is zero for AI. Besides GE, urban 
cantons such as ZH, BS and NE perform better than the Swiss average. Finally, cantons in the 
central and eastern part of Switzerland have a supply of one facility for at least 1400 children 
under age of 7. In interpreting the number for TI, we have to keep in mind that kindergartens 
in TI are integrated in the schooling system, and are thus not considered in Table 1. 
 
  In  addition  to  the  number  of  crèches  and  nurseries,  the  attendance  duration  in 
kindergartens displays a high cantonal variability. The age of entrance in kindergartens is very 
variable. In most of cantons, children attend at age 4 for a duration of 2 years. An exception 
with TI which allows the entrance at the age of 3 for a duration of 3 years. On the contrary, 5 
cantons (AI, FR, OW, SZ and ZG) fix the minimum entrance age at 5 and an attendance 
duration of 1 year (see Figure 2). Figure 2 shows that in GE and in TI, children attend the 
kindergartens for the longest time. The average duration at the Swiss level is slightly less than  
                                                 
4 The reference for the number of childcare facilities comes from the parlamentary initiative of the federal 
counsellour Jacqueline Fehr.   13 
Table 1: Number of facilities per canton, for 1000 children under age of 7
Region, canton 1985 1991 1995 1998 2001
Switzerland 0,9 1,0 1,2 1,6 2,0
Région Lémanique 1.0 1.0 1,5 2,7 2,8
Geneva (GE) 1,3 1,4 2,4 5,8 5,8
Vaud (VD) 1,3 1,0 1,4 1,7 1,8
Valais (VS) 0,1 0,2 0,6 0,7 0,8
Espace Mittelland 0,7 0,8 1,0 1,1 1,5
Bern (BE) 0,6 0,7 0,9 1,1 1,4
Fribourg (FR) 0,2 0,4 0,8 0,8 0,9
Jura (JU) 0,7 0,7 0,8 1,3 1,5
Neuchâtel (NE) 2,4 1,9 2,9 2,3 3,3
Solothurn (SO) 0,4 0,5 0,7 0,6 1,1
Nordwestschweiz 0,9 1,0 0,8 1,1 1,4
Argau (AG) 0,5 0,6 0,5 0,6 0,9
Basel-Land (BL) 0,5 0,5 0,8 0,8 1,0
Basel-Stadt (BS) 3,2 3,2 1,7 3,8 4,1
Zurich (ZH) 2,3 2,5 2,6 3,4 4,1
Ostschweiz 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,7 0,8
Appenzell A.Rh (AR) 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,7
Appenzell I.Rh (AI) 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,0 0,0
Glarus (GL) 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 1,0
Graubünden (GR) 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,5
St.Gallen (SG) 0,3 0,3 0,5 0,8 0,8
Schaffhausen (SH) 0,9 1,0 1,2 1,4 1,6
Thurgau (TG) 0,5 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,5
Zentralschweiz 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7
Luzern (LU) 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,8 0,8
Nidwalden (NW) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,7
Obwalden (OW) 0,0 0,0 0,7 0,4 0,4
Schwyz (SZ) 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,6
Uri (UR) 0,6 0,6 0,3 0,3 0,4
Zug (ZG) 0,7 0,5 1,0 0,7 0,6
Ticino (TI) 0,3 0,3 0,9 0,8 1,0
 
Source: Report on families (2004), Nordwestschweiz (Northwestern), Zentralschweiz (Central), 
Ostschweiz (Eastern). 
 
2 years. This duration has increased for 4 months since 1980/1981. Although this increase 
affects all cantons, the Central region of Switzerland has taken the least advantage of this 
increase. It is in the Latin region where the duration of attendance is the highest in 2002/2003 
with  slightly  more  than  25  months.  Then,  the  Northwestern  region  comes  at  the  second 
position with slightly more than 23 months and the Eastern region with 21 months. The    14 
Figure 2a: Age of attendance in kindergarten and in obligatory school according to legal  
dispositions in cantons, 31.12.2002 
  Age of attendance in kindergarten 
  Age of attendance in obligatory school 
 
Source: Report on families (2004). 
Figure 2b: Average attendance duration in kindergarten per canton, in years, in 2002/2003 
 
 
Source: Report on families (2004). 
Central part of Switzerland comes at the last position with 17 months. As a consequence, it 
seems  that  children  attend  kindergartens  for  longer  time  in  the  Latin  region  than  in  the 
German region.    15 
3.3. Regional differences: example of 4 cantons 
 
  In this last section, I overview the main regional differences in the structures of family 
policy in 4 cantons VD, ZH, LU and TI. This section is based on the report on families 
published by the Federal Department of Home Affairs (2004) and the OFAS report on family 
policy at the cantonal and communal level (2004). The choice of these cantons is explained by 
linguistic,  geographical  and  cultural  characteristics.  In  fact,  3  of  the  4  linguistic  regions 
(German region, French and Italian region) are represented. 
5 Within these 4 cantons, only 
cantons of VD and TI have set in their constitution important objectives and dispositions in 
terms of family policy.  For instance, in VD, the new  constitution enacted in April 2003, 
stipulates  that  the  canton  has  to  institute  a  maternity  insurance  before  2006  if  the 
Confederation has still not introduced a maternity insurance at the federal level. In TI, support 
for family tasks and for financial security of women before and after childbirth is ruled. In 
ZH,  several  laws  mention  some  important  objectives  in  terms  of  family  policy  (fiscal 
deductions, family benefits…). Finally, only the canton of LU still has no constitutional basis 
defining the principles of family policy. 
 
  The report on families (2004) shows that all cantons investigated provide, in some 
form or another, family or child benefits. The basis formula of these economic benefits is 
similar across the cantons. However, there are often differences in the levels and rates applied. 
For instance, in 2003, TI provides the highest fiscal deductions for minor children (about 
12’600 CHF per child) while cantons of ZH and LU stay at the average Swiss level (of about 
5’600 CHF per child). As for family benefits, all 4 cantons are at the average Swiss level of 
180 CHF per month and per child. Moreover, TI has at its disposal an extended legal basis 
that  rules  financial  support  to  families  (allowances  for  children  until  15;  allowances  for 
youths between 15 and 20 in training; allowances for poor families, allowances for young 
children under 3). 
 
  The survey of cantonal family policy shows that generally a very small density of 
outside care organisations is observed. Childcare for young children varies very much across 
cantons in line with different policy objectives. For example, the canton of VD has shown a 
proper engagement in childcare policy, where balancing work and family life and gender 
equality  are  explicitly  cantonal  policy  goals.  The  provision  and  the  financing  of  outside 
                                                 
5 The fourth language is “Romanche” which is the official language of the canton of GR only.   16 
childcare is thus explicitly mentioned in the new Constitution. Second, hours of the crèches 
and nurseries have to be compatible with working hours of the parents. Moreover, day-care 
units for school children (unités d’accueil pour écoliers) care for pre-school age and older 
children in centres with longer daily opening hours. In TI, the new Law on families of 2003 
specifies that measures aimed at conciliating work and family have to be promoted. Childcare 
policy targets at children older than 3 with infant schools (Scuola dell’Infanzia), which are 
part of a tradition that exists for more than 150 years. As a consequence, in VD and TI, infant 
schools make it possible to take care for most children of pre-school age for more than a half-
day  period.  On  the  contrary,  kindergartens  in  ZH  are  generally  attended  by  children  for 
periods of three to four hours per day. Most parents who wish to use childcare for more hours 
per day must combine several types of childcare to ensure all-day care, which is even more 
difficult if there is more than one child. This makes it difficult for mothers to have children 
and work full-time.  
 
The  federal  structural  poses  thus  challenges  to  childcare  policy.  While  a  strong 
integration of childcare policy exists at the cantonal level in TI and in VD, there is no clear 
cantonal engagement of ZH and LU in this domain. In these latter cantons, municipalities are 
principally responsible for outside childcare institutions. The differences observed in cantonal 
engagement of VD, TI, ZH and LU reflect the divergences of the political traditions that 
govern the political life in the cantons. On the one hand, a model based on the principle that 
the state is more active prevails in the Latin part of Switzerland (VD and TI). On the other 
hand, the idea of independence of communes and of subsidiary implementation that limits the 
intervention of the state to the minimum is more anchored in the German part of Switzerland 
(ZH and LU). Therefore, these differences observed in political positions of leaders reflect 
shortages of supply in formal childcare services. In terms of use of childcare, parents living in 
the  Latin  part  of  Switzerland  generally  use  more  non-parental  childcare  facilities  (this 
concerns 35% of households with children under 15) than those in the German part (27%, see 
the study by Buhmann, 2001).  
 
To conclude, it seems that the regional differences between the Latin and the German 
part are less pronounced in terms of economic interventions. However, both financial and 
socio-institutional  interventions  indicate  that  the  Latin  region  provides  more  support  to 
families that help the family/work balance than the German region.  
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4  Descriptive statistics 
 
 
4.1. Fertility behaviour 
 
Low fertility is increasingly becoming a policy concern in Switzerland because of its 
negative  consequences  for  future  labour  supply  and  the  financial  sustainability  of  social 
protection systems. Since the 1980s, the total fertility rate has been fluctuated around 1.4-1.5 
children per woman. The postponement of marriage and childbearing is one of the reasons for 
the decline in fertility. From 1970 to 2000, the mean age at childbirth has increased by 4 
years, largely in parallel to the increase in age at marriage (see Figure 3). The increase in the 
proportion  of  not  marrying  and  the  decline  in  marital  fertility  itself  are  other  important 
factors. In 2000, 22% of all women at age 40 are childless and 15% have only one child. 
High-skilled women have no child, with 4 of 10 women with tertiary education remaining 
childless,  presumably  to  avoid  decreasing  their  career  opportunities  (see  the  report  on 
families, 2004). To what extent the increase in female employment has contributed to the 
decline in the fertility is a matter of debate. However, a negative relationship between fertility 
and employment is observed in Switzerland (see Figure 4). 
Figure 3:  Mean age of women at first marriage and childbirth, 1970-2002 
 
 Age at first marriage for a woman       Age at first marriage for a man 
 Age at first childbirth for a married woman     Age at first childbirth for a married man 
 Age at first childbirth for a non married woman 
 
 
Source: Report on families (2004).   18 













Source: OECD (2004b). 
 
 
4.2. Mothers in employment 
 
In this section, I provide some first descriptive statistics about employment patterns of women 
according to the family composition. Table 2 investigates to what extent the marital and the 
family  status  influence  both  participation  and  labour  supply  choices.  It  turns  out  that  in 
Switzerland the partner effect is very marked: in 2003, the probability of not working for a 
childless married woman is twice the one for a childless non-married woman. Bauer (1998) 
has also found the similar result. This finding may be due to the strong association between 
marriage  and  childbirth  decisions.  In  fact,  married  women  anticipate  childbirth  event  by 
reducing  their  participation  rate  or/and  by  supplying  less  hours  for  those  who  work.  The 
presence of children exerts a complementary role in reducing the participation decision. The 
probability of not working is 32% for married women having one child. In addition, Table 2 
shows that the way the family enlargement affects labour supply has changed over time. At 
the  beginning  of  the  decade,  a  larger  family  leads  to  an  increase  in  non-participation. 
Nowadays, women prefer to work part-time when family becomes larger. Concerning single 
mothers, they are more likely to participate and to supply a higher number of hours than their 
married counterparts.   19 
Table 2: Civil status and employment of women
Situation Not working Working part-time 1 Working part-time 2 Working full-time
Year 1991 1999 2003 1991 1999 2003 1991 1999 2003 1991 1999 2003
Non married childless 7,3 8,7 8,0 4,0 4,9 4,6 17,1 17,9 21,5 71,6 68,5 65,9
Married 
Childless 21,1 18,9 16,3 19,0 16,3 15,7 23,1 27,7 30,6 36,8 37,0 37,4
One child 32,3 31,2 24,4 30,2 24,6 30,6 17,3 27,1 27,9 20,2 17,1 17,1
Two children 42,2 34,8 28,3 37,2 35,2 40,2 13,3 18,7 22,7 7,3 11,3 8,9
Single mother 16,7 16,4 12,7 9,9 10,3 18,9 29,6 35,7 44,4 43,8 37,6 24,0
Notes: Women are between 25 and 55 years old. The situation is defined by: probability of not working for pNW; 
of working part-time with a degree of occupation of less than 49% (resp. between 50% and 89%) for pPT1 (resp. pPT2) 
and of working full-time for pFT (with a degree of occupation of more than 89%). 
Source: SLFS 1991-2003.
pNW 1 pPT 2 pPT pFT
 
 
  The age of the youngest child is also a critical factor in the participation decision. 
Table 3 indicates that in 2003 the participation rate of all mothers having children under 6 is 
about 68% against 82% for women with children older than 6. Thus having young children 
decreases participation. Table 3 further shows differences by education level. Participation 
rates of less educated mothers are lagging behind. One reason is the lower benefit they can 
expect  from  the  labour  market.  They  are  indeed  less  likely  to  be  granted  working 
arrangements  by  firms.  The  second  fact  concerns  single  mothers  who  have  a  higher 
participation rate than their counterparts living in couples. This is related to the fact that they 
have to maintain the household income. The only way of combining work and family in the 
situation of lacking childcare infrastructure is to work part-time. In fact, Table 2 indicates that 
63%  of  single  mothers  work  part-time.  As  a  consequence,  there  is  a  potential  source  of 
underused labour supply that is mainly attributed to the lack of childcare services.  
Table 3: Participation rates of mothers with children under 6
Year
All All Share
mothers low medium high mothers
1991 49,9 47,5 56,6 57,2 78,9 4,6
1999 60,2 60,2 60,5 72,7 77,8 4,9
2003 66,7 61,9 63,6 81,5 86,1 5,7
Notes: Women are between 25 and 55 years old. "low" means primary, "medium" secondary and "high" tertiary level
Source: SLFS 1991-2003.
Mothers living in couples
By educational level
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4.3. Definition of the states of the labour force   
 
  This section presents the data used in the empirical analysis. This study is based on the 
data of the Swiss Labour Force Survey collected by the Swiss Federal Office since 1991. The 
Survey is carried out once a year, during the 2
nd quarter (April-June). It covers the population 
of persons aged 15 or more who are permanent residents in Switzerland (at least for one 
year).
6  The  Swiss  Labour  Force  Survey  provides  important  internationally  comparable 
information on the labour market situation in Switzerland. Each year approximately 16'000 
persons randomly drawn from the phone register of the Swiss PTT are interviewed.
7 Given 
the chosen survey method (through phone interviews), only the household that dispose of a 
private  telephone  are  taken  into  consideration.  As  a  consequence,  all  persons  having  no 
telephone or having a cell phone are not covered by the survey. Participation is voluntary. 
Questions are asked on work activity, professional experience, working times and conditions, 
job seeking, former occupation, reasons for not being economically active and incomes. The 
data collected provide information about socio-demographic characteristics of the employed, 
unemployed and inactive individuals. This empirical study uses the waves from 1991 to 2003. 
The  data  set  consists  of  a  rotating  panel:  each  year,  one  fifth  of  the  individuals  already 
included  in  the  sample  is  replaced  and  the  other  four  fifths  are  re-interviewed.  As  a 
consequence, an individual can stay in the sample for at most 5 consecutive years.  
 
The empirical analysis concentrates on women between 17 and 51 years, because they 
are at risk of devoting time to childbearing and rearing. To define the employment situation, I 
consider 4 labour market states: i)- non working (NW), ii)- working part-time with a degree of 
occupation of less than 49% (PT1), iii)- working part-time with a work degree between 50% 
and 89% (PT2) and iv)- working full-time (FT). Two points concerning the definition of the 
states should be discussed briefly. First, the definition of the states is based on the natural 
ranking in the hours of labour supply.
8 Second, it would be restrictive to consider only one 
state for part-time work. Indeed, a feature of the Swiss labour market is that the fraction of 
women working part-time is very high compared to other OECD countries (see OECD, 2003 
and OFS, 2000). In addition, part-time work in Switzerland covers a high range on working 
hours. It is thus hard to believe that all deviations from 20 and 42 hours can be interpreted as 
                                                 
6 Individuals living in Switzerland during a short period, the cross-border workers and the refugees are excluded. 
7 From 2002, the number of persons randomly chosen increased to about 40’000 persons. 
8 The distribution of observed hours of work has 2 modes with peaks around 20 and 42 hours per week (see 
Appendix A2). A degree of occupation of 90% and of 50% corresponds to 42 and 21 hours per week.    21 
measurement  errors  or  as  random  fluctuations  of  working  time.  That  is  why,  I  use  two 
different states for part-time employment.  
 
One purpose of this study is to look at the regional differences in the labour supply 
after childbirth. Table 4 reports the fractions of being in a given state of the labour market at 
year t conditional on childbirth event at t-1.
9 It seems that slightly a half of women do not 
work one year following childbirth. In addition, Table 4 reports marked differences in the 
labour supply between mothers living in the Latin and in the German part of Switzerland.  
Table 4: Regional differences in labour supply after childbirth
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It turns out that Latin mothers are more attached to the labour market: conditional on working, 
they are more likely to report a higher degree of occupation than their German counterparts. 
For instance, Latin mothers have a full-time employment probability of 12% against 5% for 
German mothers. This result is in line with the institutional facts presented in the previous 
section that the family policy in the Latin part is more friendly for the work/family balance 
than in the German part. Besides fostering employment of mothers, a family friendly policy 
can achieve the goal of maintaining or increasing the fertility rate. In fact, a recent study by 
Wanner  and  Fei  (2004)  about  fertility  in  the  Swiss  communes  between  1970  and  2000 
indicates that over the period 1990-2000, the French part of Switzerland had a higher fertility 
rate than the German part.
10 As a consequence, the main policy recommendation that can 
result  from  the  descriptive  statistics  is  to  promote  (full-time)  female  employment  by 
increasing public spending on childcare structures. The major challenge that Switzerland will 
face is to make the actions of the different administrative levels more coordinated, perhaps 
through a harmonisation at the federal level. 
                                                 
9 As no information concerning the month of birth is available in the data, the event of childbirth occurs when 
the age of the youngest child is 0 (i.e. when the child is between 0 and 11 months). 
10 The evolution of fertility in time indicates that 2,2 children were born in 1970 in the German part against 1,39 
in 2000. The statistics for the French part is of 1,83 children in 1970 against 1,49 in 2000 and for the Italian part 
of 2 children in 1970 against 1.26 in 2000 (see Wanner and Fei, 2004).    22 
5  Methodological framework  
 
 
5.1. Structural model 
 
  Employment  behaviour  of  a  mother  depends  on  the  utility  she  can  expect  from 
working and non-working. In this paper, I assume a simple model of female labour supply 
along the lines of the (neo-classical) static model. In the neo-classical model of labour supply, 
women have preferences over consumption C  and leisure  L that are represented by a utility 
function  of  the  form  ( ) , , U U C L Z = ,  where  Z   stands  for  a  set  of  socio-demographic 
characteristics. They face a budget constraint that limits the consumption possibilities for a 
given wage rate W and an unearned income level Y, C WH Y = + . The hours of work  H  and 
leisure are related by the identity  H T L = − , where  T  represents the total amount of time 
available.  Women  maximise  their  utility  function  under  the  budget  constraint.  This 
maximisation leads to the derivation of the optimal labour supply level  ( ) , ,
opt h h W Y Z = , 
which  depends  on  i)  socio-demographic  characteristics  (which  influence  the  shape  of 
preferences), on ii) wage rates, unearned income and the tax system (which define the shape 
in  the  budget  constraint).  At  this  stage,  some  points  about  the  implications  of  the  Swiss 
institutional features on this labour supply model deserve attention.  
 
Due to the complexities of the Swiss tax system, I choose not to model the effect of 
taxes on labour supply. Indeed, the main feature of the Swiss tax system is that federal taxes 
are only a minor part of total tax payments. The majority consists of cantonal and communal 
taxes. In this study, I retain only the fact that couples can file only jointly and that second 
earners face relatively high marginal tax rates. I set a discrete choice model where women 
have the choice between discrete hours alternatives. More details about this specification are 
given in the next section. 
 
Furthermore, I assume that women take the labour supply of their partner as given 
when they determine the number of working hours. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
determine whether or not an income sharing rule has to be accounted for.
11 In Switzerland, the 
traditional choice model of paid and unpaid work prevails: in this model, men are the main 
                                                 
11 More general models of household labour supply explicitly consider the income sharing rule (see for instance 
Beblo, Beninger and Laisney, 2003; Vermeulen, 2002; and van Soest, 1995).   23 
earners  and  women  are  the  second  earners.  This  is  reflected  in  the  employment  patterns 
between men and women: the participation rate of prime age men is very high (about 90%) 
while part-time work is an exception among working men (about 7%). It seems thus to be not 
restrictive to consider that in this study, partner’s labour supply is given in female labour 
supply. 
 
Possible explanatory variables for the employment decision are earnings capacity of 
household (own wage and alternative income resources such as partner’s earnings) and some 
variables capturing socio-demographical characteristics such as age and education. In the rest 
of this section, I discuss the statements that can be made about these variables conditional on 
the Swiss institutional features. In this study, the lack of data on partner’s earnings do not 
allow me to construct accurately the women’s unearned income variable Y. Instead, the data 
provide detailed information about partner’s education. I assume that a partner with a tertiary 
level of education is more likely to have a higher income than a partner with a primary or 
secondary level. As a consequence, I expect that the presence of a highly educated partner 
will have a disincentive effect on spouse’s labour supply.  
 
The next point concerns the definition of female’s earnings. The data I have at my 
disposal provide information about yearly net earnings and hours worked in the last week.
12 
The wage variable w capturing the wage rate thus can be constructed. Woman’s wage enters 
both the opportunity cost of children and the utility of participation. However, the use of the 
woman’s wage as an explanatory variable in the fertility and labour supply equations poses 
two problems. First, the wage is not observed for non-working women. Second, the wage is 
likely to be correlated with unobserved variables affecting both fertility and labour supply. 
Here, I adopt the standard solution to these problems which consists in estimating a wage 
equation  on  the  working  sub-sample  and  correcting  for  selection  bias  using  the  2-step 
procedure suggested by Heckman (1979). In this way, the simultaneity problem is solved with 
a 2SLS technique, and the problem of unobserved wages is solved by imputing the predicted 
wages to not working women. Using predicted wages for non-working women will introduce 
two distinct distributions for wages. As a consequence, I use predicted wages for all women, 
including  the  working.  The  two-stage  Heckman’s  approach  is  based  on  the  existence  of 
instrumental  variables.  Here,  household  composition  (marital  status,  number  and  age 
                                                 
12 The yearly net earnings variable is a reconstructed variable delivered by the Statistical Federal Office.    24 
distribution of children) are the exclusion restrictions, because it seems not to restrictive to 
claim that marital and family status influence the working decision, but not the hourly wage 
rate (which does not depend on the number of hours of work). Estimation results for the wage 
regression are presented in Appendix A.3. One can expect that wage will have a positive 
effect on the propensity of mothers to work after childbirth.  
   
  The above mentioned variables capture the different sources of household income. 
Beside these financial resources, the degree of labour market orientation can exert an impact 
on mother’s employment after childbirth. As a consequence, I control for mother’s age and 
education. The motivation for this is that more educated and older women will return to the 
labour  force  soon  after  childbirth.  I  also  include  a  set  of  interaction  dummies  between 
mother’s age and education in order to give more flexibility to the functional form of the 
employment  equation.  Additionally,  willingness  to  work  might  depend  on  cultural 
background. This is the reason why I include a dummy variable for being a foreign mother. 
There is a stylised fact in Switzerland that foreign women are more likely to participate in the 
labour market than the Swiss ones because of the financial constraints the foreign households 
face (OECD, 1996). These financial constraints force women to return to the labour market 
soon after childbirth.  
 
Next, I discuss the effect of children aged more than 1. This effect is specified by 
interacting the number and age of the children already living in the household. This allows me 
to capture the institutional context. It might be indeed important whether further children in 
the household are below age 7, the age of enrolment in primary school. Furthermore, I control 
for the degree of urbanisation by including a dummy for living in highly urbanised cantons 
such as BS, ZH and GE. Actually, the assumption I make here is that persons living in the 
cities of Basel, Zurich and Geneva are similar to the persons living in other communes of the 
corresponding cantons.  This assumption is restrictive, but the information about the degree of 
urbanisation is missing in the data. The reason for including this variable is that one might 
think that larger cities offer more opportunities of childcare than rural areas. The last specified 
variables  give  some  indications  about  time  pattern.  In  the  considered  time  span,  female 
participation  rate  has  been  increasing  since  the  beginning  of  the  1990s.  In  line  with  this 
increase, fertility rate has decreased. In order to capture this time pattern, I specify a time 
trend. A description of the variables used in the study is presented in Appendix A.4.   25 
5.2. Reduced form model 
 
  In analysis the labour supply of women after childbirth, the focus on the sample of 
mothers may lead to a selection problem, since other reasons (that are unobserved to the 
econometrician) can make some career-oriented women less prone to give birth than those 
who  have  a  lower  labour  force  attachment.  If  these  unobserved  factors  influence  both 
childbirth  and  employment  decisions,  then  analysing  work  behaviour  of  women  while 
restricting the sample to mothers could lead to biased results. One solution to this selectivity 
problem is to model the selection into motherhood. In this case, I follow the approach of Hotz 
and Miller (1988) and I estimate the determinants of labour supply simultaneously with those 
for childbirth (see for instance the recent empirical studies by Büchel and van Haam, 2004 
and by Lauer and Weber, 2003, which also use a sample selection model). The estimation 
technique is derived from the Heckman’s (1979) two-step approach. Again, this approach of 
taking  the  sample  selection  problem  into  account  is  viable  in  presence  of  instrumental 
variables.  This  point  about  exclusion  restriction  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  section  on 
identification. The rest of this section presents the model which specifies the joint probability 
distribution of fertility and labour supply.  
 
The difference with the standard Heckman’s two-step approach is that the dependent 
variables involved in the “selection” and “regression” equations are both discrete. Van de Ven 
and Van Praag (1981) develop a bivariate probit model with sample selection in order to 
estimate a two-step selection model in presence of two binary outcomes. The model presented 
in this section is an extension of this latter model. It stems from the formulations proposed by 
Huang et al (1999), and Weber and Lauer (2003) where a categorical variable enters the 
“regression” equation.  
 
  In the first step, the probability of giving birth is specified by writing a “fertility” 
equation. Let us assume that 
*
i F  represents a latent index measuring the disutility of giving 
birth  for  woman  i.  Conditional  on  some  observed  variables  i Z   that  relate  to  woman  i’s 
characteristics, and on some unobserved factors  i u , this disutility is defined as follows:  
*
i i i F Z u γ = − + ,                    (1)   26 
where  1,..., i N =  and γ  is the parameter vector measuring the impact of variables  i Z  on the 
disutility of woman i. The index 
*
i F  is not observable. Instead, one has information about a 
binary variable indicating whether woman i has given birth or not. The latent variable and the 
observable variable are related by the following expression: 
*
*
1 if   0,
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                      (2) 
Using the above definition, the event  0 i F =  corresponds to women not giving birth while 
1 i F =  refers to women who give birth. 
 
  In the second step, I give a functional specification to the utility function U presented 
in the structural model of the last section. Let us assume that 
*
i A  represents this latent utility 
index for the inclination to work. Woman i who becomes a mother knows her own utility 
from  work  activities,  which  depends  on  certain  measurable  factors  i X   and  certain 
unobservable factors  i e . We can write the following equation: 
*
i i i A X e β = + ,                     (3) 
where  β   is  the  parameter  vector  measuring  the  effect  of  variables  i X   on  the  mother’s 
propensity to work. Here, I assume a discrete choice labour supply model. Women have the 
choices  between  4  hours  alternatives.  These  4  states  refer  to  NW  workers  ( ) 1 i A = ,  PT1 
workers ( ) 2 i A = , PT2 workers ( ) 3 i A =  and FT workers ( ) 4 i A =  (see Section 4.3 about the 
exact definition of these states). These 4 employment categories can relate to an ordered 
choice  modelling  framework  in  the  sense  they  represent  the  labour  supply  in  hours.  The 
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                  (4) 
The µ ’s are unknown parameters to be estimated together with β . 
 
  Turning to the distributional assumptions for the error terms in equations (1) and (3), I 
assume that u and e follow a bivariate standard normal distribution which can be expressed in 
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Using  this  assumption,  one  can  derive  the  probabilities  of  the  events  0 i F =   and 
{ } 1, i i F A j = =  with  1,...,4 j =  (see Appendix A.5): 
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The functions  Φand  2 Φ  stand for the standard and  for the bivariate normal distribution 
functions. The set of parameters to be estimated is composed of the coefficients β , γ  and the 
thresholds  µ  as well as of the correlation parameter  ρ  and the variances 
2
u σ  and 
2
e σ . The 
coefficients  β   and  γ   are  identified  only  to  a  scale  factor.  As  a  consequence,  I  use  the 
standard normalisation 
2 1 u σ =  and 
2 1 e σ =  which are specified in discrete choice models as 
identification assumptions. The parameters of interest can thus be recovered by maximising 
the following likelihood function:  
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5.3. Identification of the model 
 
  When specifying a two-step model, we have to ensure the model is properly identified 
(see Heckman, 1979). The strategy relies on the availability of some instrumental variables 
that affect only the fertility decision and not the employment decision. Here, the difficulty is 
that we can expect very similar factors to influence both the probabilities to be a mother and 
to work. For instance, we may think that some socio-demographic variables such as age and 
education are determinants of both fertility and employment decisions. The strategy I adopt 
here comes from the studies by Angrist and Evans (1998) and Carrasco (2001). The idea is to 
use the sex of previous children as instrument. This follows from the wide consensus in the 
demography literature about parents’ preferences for families with at least one child of each   28 
sex. They are thus more likely to have an additional child if the previous ones are of the same 
gender. This instrument is valid when the desire for children is 2 or higher. Nevertheless, I do 
not  exclude  from  the  sample  women  with  less than  two  children,  because  they  could  be 
relevant to analyse other aspects of the model.
13 Hence, the dummy variable whether the sex 
of the next child matches the sex of the previous children is used as the instrument of this 
study. 
 
The next point argues why sibling-sex composition is a good instrument for fertility.  
Our data indicate that the fraction of women who had a second child is almost invariant to the 
sex of the first child (47.1% if the first child is a boy against 45.6% if it is a girl). However, 
this changes when the sex of the first two children is accounted for. Women with 2 children of 
the same sex are more likely to have a third child: only 21.2% of women with 1 boy and 1 girl 
have  a  third  child  compared  to  27.8%  and  24.7%  for  women  with  2  girls  and  2  boys 
respectively. In addition, the fraction of mothers with 1 boy and 1 girl who work is 65.5% and 
65.0% for those having 2 girls or 2 boys. Some other indirect evidence in favour of the same-
sex exclusion restriction comes from families with only one child. The data indicate that the 
fraction of mothers with 1 boy or 1 girl who work are 73.1% and 72.1% respectively. There is 
thus no significant association between the probability for a mother to work and the sex of her 
first-born child. This finding supports the fact that the sex of children itself is not related to 
labour supply.  As a consequence, the variable same-sex seems to be a good instrument. 
 
  Lastly, I discuss some points about the timing of both fertility and employment events. 
As  suggested  in  the  study  by  Lauer  and  Weber  (2003),  the  information  used  to  explain 
childbirth  decision  comes  from  the  year  preceding  the  birth  event
14.  Then,  in  order  to 
investigate to what extent a mother will work after childbirth, I look at the labour force state 
occupied in the second year following childbirth, i.e. at a point in time when the child is 
between 12 and 23 months. This means that three waves of the SLFS are used to analyse the 
employment behaviour of mothers. Actually, I could have looked at the employment situation 
at a later point of time after childbirth, because the SLFS presents the special feature of being 
a rotating panel such that an individual can be observed for at most 5 consecutive years. 
However, the number of persons will be insufficient in order to perform an empirical analysis. 
                                                 
13  In  addition,  the  fraction  of  women  with  at  least  2  children  amounts  to  56%  for  women  of  age  35  (35 
corresponds to the mean age in the sample). 
14 The data do not provide information about the month of childbirth. They only report age in years of each child 
living in the household. Therefore, I define birth when a child is aged 0, i.e. between 1 and 11 months.    29 
Finally, a birth event that occurs at point t is merged with the data from  1 t I −  as information for 
the birth equation and with the data from  1 t I +  from which I draw the information for the 
employment status and for the determinants of labour supply.  
 
 
6  Estimation results  
 
 
In the empirical analysis, I further restrict attention to women between 25 and 51 
years, who are at risk of devoting time for childbearing and rearing without being involved in 
education and retirement decisions. This restriction leads to a sample of 19834 women. 
 
6.1. Specification tests 
 
  Appendix A.6 presents the results of different specification tests. First, I run a series of 
Wald tests to test the joint significance of the coefficients for the variables used in the fertility 
and employment equations. These tests are run on the coefficients for groups of variables 
such as age dummies or regional dummies. The rule is that a group is retained in the final 
specification using a significance level of 10 percent as a criterion in order to control for a 5% 
size at the  end of the sequence.  It turns out that nationality  does not influence the birth 
decision. In addition, education dummies, time trend variables and own previous earnings 
seem not to influence the employment decision for women conditional on having become a 
mother. Second, I run some global Wald tests based on the final specificaton. The results 
indicate that the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients in the two equations can be set to 
zero is rejected. 
 
In order to account for the regional differences between the Latin and the German part 
of Switzerland, I test whether the coefficients of the equations differ accross the region. As a 
consequence, I interact the explanatory variables with a dummy for the Latin region and I test 
for the significance of these interaction terms. Furthermore, I allow regional differences in the 
intercept for the birth equation and in the thresholds for the employment equation. For the 
birth  equation,  the  tests  reported  in  Appendix  A.6  show  that  the  intercept  does  not  vary 
significantly  between  the  Latin  and  the  German  regions.  On  the  contrary,  the  slope 
coefficients  for  the  time  trend  variables  vary  significantly  across  the  regions.  As  a 
consequence, I take account for such a variation by interacting the trend variables with a   30 
dummy capturing the linguistic region. For the employment equation, the tests indicate that 
there is no significant difference between the regions in the first thresholds. In this case, I use 
a common threshold for the Latin and the German regions in the final retained specification. 
Finally, for the other two thresholds, it turns out that they vary significantly across regions. 
Therefore, I estimate separate effects for the second and the third thresholds. 
 
6.2. Determinants of fertility decision 
 
Tables 5 and 6 present the estimation results for the model with sample selection. 
First, it turns out that ignoring the selectivity into motherhood when analysing the labour 
force supply of mothers leads to biased results. The correlation coefficient between both the 
fertility and employment equations is significant (see Table 6). Therefore, the labour force 
supply of mothers has to be estimated simultaneously with their propensity to give birth.  
 
In a first point, I discuss the results obtained for the fertility equation (see Table 5). 
The results on age characteristics indicate that women between 25 and 29 are the most likely 
to become mothers. Then, their probability to give birth declines as they become older. The 
education differences show that highly educated women are more prone to give birth than 
women with a secondary level of education. This is rather surprising since I would expect that 
highly educated women are more likely to be labour market oriented i.e. they will have a 
lower probability to give birth. The higher propensity to give birth for highly educated women 
could be explained by the fact that they are more likely to be younger than their less educated 
counterparts.
15 Results on the interaction terms between age and education dummies permit to 
shed some lights on the fertility behaviour of labour market oriented women. The negative 
effect in Table 5 indicates that the probability to become a mother decreases when a highly 
educated woman is between 25 and 29 years old. Moreover, this negative effect reduces as the 
highly educated woman becomes older. Older educated women tend to postpone childbirth 
event to a later point in time. All these results are in line with the predictions of the theory of 
time allocation that labour market oriented women are less likely to give birth (see Becker, 
1965 and 1994).  
 
Looking at the variables capturing the family background, women living alone are less 
likely to have children compared to cohabiting women. In this study, I assume that marital  
                                                 
15 for instance, 42.7% of less educated women are older than 40 against 34.2% of highly educated women.   31 
Table 5: Determinants of fertility decision
Variables Coeff. Std.err.
Socio-demographics
Age (ref: older than 40)
between 25 and 29 0,59 0,05
between 30 and 34 0,53 0,05
between 35 and 39 0,19 0,06
Marital status
no partner (ref: cohabiting) -0,81 0,06
Level of education (ref: secondary level)
low educated (primary level) -0,08 0,05
high educated (tertiary level) 0,19 0,09
Age and education
25-29 years old and high educated -0,42 0,14
30-34 years old and high educated -0,22 0,12
35-34 years old and high educated 0,00 0,12
Household composition
Number and age of children (ref: no child)
First child aged 1-2 0,69 0,05
First child aged 3-6 0,45 0,06
First child older than 7 -0,44 0,08
Second child aged 1-2 -0,24 0,07
Second child aged 3-6 -0,44 0,08
Second child older than 7 -0,95 0,11
Subsequent child aged 1-2 -0,43 0,10
Subsequent child aged 3-6 -0,44 0,14
Subsequent child older than 7 -1,14 0,21
Same sex  0,16 0,06
Regional characteristics
highly urbanised areas (ref: less urbanised) 0,06 0,06
Nordwestschweiz (ref: Ostschweiz) -0,21 0,07
Zentralschweiz 0,03 0,07
Zurich -0,14 0,08
Espace Mittelland -0,20 0,10




partner is highly educated 0,19 0,04
Time trend
Trend*German part  -0,82 0,31
Trend squared*German part 0,72 0,25
Constant -1,43 0,12
Notes: log-likelihood:-4884.24, number of observations: 23852. Bold: significant at 5% level,
Italics: significant at 10%. The dependent variable is birth at time t and is explained using 
information from time t-1.    32 
status enters the fertility equation exogenously.  To the extent that marriage decisions are 
correlated with childbearing decisions, our estimates may not yield valid inferences about 
fertility and female labour supply. This implies that the estimation coefficients are more likely 
to  capture  a  correlation  than  a  causal  relationship.  A  way  of  addressing  the  issue  of  the 
potential endogeneity of marriage decision is to specify a model for the marital formation. In 
this case, the problem is that a valid instrument is needed i.e. it has to be correlated with 
marriage decision without influencing the fertility decision. To my knowledge, the data do not 
dispose of any such variable. Hence, this issue of endogeneity is left for future research. The 
marriage decision is an issue that deserves as much attention as the childbearing decision. 
 
Looking at the effect of family composition, the probability to have an additional child 
decreases with the number of children already living in the household. Beside this quantitative 
effect, the distribution of age plays a further explanatory role: as the youngest child becomes 
older, the probability to give birth to an additional child is lower. Since older women have 
older children, the age coefficient reflects more the effect of age itself than the effect of age of 
the youngest child. In addition, the probability to have a further child is the highest for women 
whose first child is of younger age (1-2 years old). This can be explained by the fact that 
parents prefer to avoid a large age difference between two consecutive children. Furthermore, 
having two children of the same sex increases the probability to have a third child. This 
reveals the preference of parents to have children of different genders. 
 
The results indicate that there is no significant difference in fertility between women 
living in a highly urbanised area and those living in a less urbanised area. Turning to regional 
dummies, I find significant negative effects for the regions Zurich and Nordwestschweiz. This 
result  can  reflect  the  general  insufficient  provision  of  formal  childcare  services  in 
Switzerland,  even  in  highly  urbanised  cantons.  Zurich  and  Nordwestschweiz  are  indeed 
regions with a relative high population density and a high urbanisation level compared to 
Ostschweiz. The regional differences provide also some insights about linguistic differences. 
The negative effects found for the Région Lémanique, Espace Mittelland and Ticino show 
that women living in the Latin part of Switzerland are less likely to give birth than women 
living in Ostschweiz (German part of Switzerland).  
 
As  mentioned  in  Section  5.1,  I  would  expect  that  woman’s  earnings  preceding 
childbirth would negatively influence the decision to give birth. The regression yields the   33 
expected effect: the higher the woman’s wage is, the lower is the probability to give birth. As 
a  consequence,  mothers’  earnings  prior  to  potential  birth  exert  a  statistically  significant 
negative impact on the decision to give birth. This means that the opportunity costs of work 
interruption around the time of childbirth seems to be relevant for birth decision. In addition 
to own earnings, partner’s earnings also influence the fertility decision. In this study, the 
partner’s  education  level  is  a  proxy  for  the  partner’s  income.  We  observed  a  positive 
correlation between the probability of giving birth and the fact that women live with a highly 
educated partner. Partner’s earnings play the role of an alternative source of income when the 
woman interrupts her career for childbearing reasons. This latter result is in line with the 
study by Hotz and Miller (1988) that increasing the father’s income significantly increases the 
probability of another birth. As a consequence, childcare expenditures which would reduce 
the utility of having an additional child are compensated by father’s income. 
 
While no significant time trend is found for the fertility decision in the Latin region, a 
significant negative trend is observed in the German region for the considered observation 
period. Women were more prone to become mothers in the beginning of the 1990s compared 
to  the  beginning  of  the  2000s.  In  addition,  the  positive  effect  found  in  the  quadratic 
specification of time trend gives some indication of the time pattern in the German region. 
The decrease of fertility speeds up during the last decade. This can reflect the deterioration of 
the labour market with an increasing unemployment rate, such that the risk for the partner to 
become  unemployed  forces  women  to  delay  birth.  However,  this  can  also  indicate  that 
childcare  policy  of  the  1990s  did  not  raise  fertility  in  the  German  speaking  part  of 
Switzerland.  This  finding  is  confirmed  by  the  higher  fertility  rates  observed  in  the  Latin 
regions (see Wanner and Fei, 2004). It is admitted that the provision of childcare institutions 
is generally insufficient in Switzerland: the supply of nurseries, kindergartens or day-care 
centres does not meet the demand. However, the analysis of childcare policy at the regional 
level in Section 3 indicates that the balance between work and family is even more difficult in 
the German speaking cantons. As a consequence, family policy of the 1990s seemed to not 
make progress fertility, especially in the German part of Switzerland. 
 
6.3. Determinants of employment decision 
 
Table 6 presents the effects of the determinants of employment after childbirth. In addition, I 
report in Table 7a the marginal effects of the corresponding explanatory variables presented in   34 
Table 6. The conditional probabilities of the states of the labour force  ( ) 1 i i p A j F = =  are first 
calculated for the reference person. This reference person corresponds to a woman having no 
child born before the childbirth event  1 i F = , living without a partner or having a less educated 
partner. In addition, this reference woman is Swiss by citizenship, older than 35 and lives in 
the German speaking part of Switzerland. Then, I recalculate these conditional employment 
probabilities by  changing the variables of interest from the reference  category to  another 
category.  Finally,  the  marginal  effects  are  obtained  by  taking  the  difference  between  the 
“reference”  and  the  “recalculated”  employment  probabilities.  Computing  these  marginal 
effects is useful in order to investigate to  what extent a change in  a variable  affects the 
probability of not working and of working part-time or full-time. 
 
Table 6 indicates that negative age effects are obtained. It turns out that young mothers 
are  more  likely  to  display  a  lower  level  of  labour  supply,  especially  those  in  their  late 
twenties. The negative effect decreases when the mother becomes older: the labour market 
attachment after childbirth thus seems to increase with age. This result is in line with the 
hypothesis that more labour market oriented mothers will delay their childbirth compared to 
family-oriented mothers. As a consequence, older mothers return to work soon after childbirth 
occurs. This is confirmed by the marginal effects in Table 7a: the marginal effect of age 
dummies on the probability of not working after childbirth is larger for mothers aged 25-30 
than for mothers aged 31-35. In addition, mothers older than 35 will supply more hours of 
work than their younger counterparts who are more likely to work with an occupation degree 
of less than 50% (see the positive marginal effects on  1 PT  and negative effects on  2 PT  and 
FT for mothers younger than 35). 
 
The coefficient for education is significant in the specification allowing the interaction 
between age and education dummies. The positive impact of education indicates that highly 
educated mothers are likely to be highly attached to the labour market by working one year 
after childbirth. The role of education of mothers is central in the special institutional context 
characterised by high costs of childcare provision. Highly educated mothers will expect a 
positive  benefit  from  their  working  activity  that  will  compensate  childcare  costs.  On  the 
contrary, for the less educated mothers, the benefit they can expect from working is lower and 
cannot  cover  childcare  costs.  Hence,  the  lack  of  childcare  facilities  will  reduce  the 
possibilities for the less educated mothers of entering the labour market and of supplying a    35 
Table 6: Determinants of employment decision
Variables Coeff. Std.err.
Socio-demographics
Age (ref: older than 35)
between 25 and 30 -0,19 0,10
between 31 and 35 -0,09 0,05
Marital status
married (ref: non married) -0,44 0,16
Foreign citizenship 
non Swiss (ref: Swiss) 0,29 0,10
Age and education
25-30 years old and highly educated 0,47 0,19
31-35 years old and highly educated 0,34 0,13
Household composition
Number and age existing children (ref: no child*)
First child aged 1-2 -0,19 0,15
First child aged 3-6 -0,16 0,12
First child older than 7 -0,25 0,28
Second and subsequent child aged 1-2 -0,22 0,17
Second and subsequent child aged 3-6 -0,61 0,11
Second and subsequent child older than 7 -0,56 0,20
Regional characteristics
high urbanised areas (ref: few urbanised) 0,12 0,07
Earnings capacity
partner is highly educated -0,15 0,08
Thresholds
first threshold -0,23 0,36
second threshold 0,80 0,33
third threshold 1,52 0,32
Correlation coefficient -0,29 0,12
Interaction terms for the Latin part
partner is highly educated 0,27 0,13
1 child aged 1-2 0,35 0,24
1 child aged 3-6 -0,24 0,12
1 child older than 7 -0,09 0,34
second threshold -0,58 0,07
third threshold -0,47 0,11
 
Notes: log-likelihood: -4884.24.13, number of observations: 23852. Bold: significant at 
5%  level, Italics: significant at 10%. * existing children in the household excluding the 
recently born child. 
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high number of hours. This result is in line with the one obtained by Wanner et al. (2003). As 
a consequence, the general lack of childcare provision in Switzerland will deteriorate the 
situation of these mothers since a non-return to the labour market does not help to maintain 
their skills.  
 
In addition, the positive impact of age and education interaction terms is in line with 
the previous result that highly educated and older women are likely to delay childbirth. Now, 
these women will return to work soon after childbirth. Hence, women who had invested more 
in their human capital are more labour market oriented. A further glance at these positive 
coefficients seems to indicate that the impact on employment is higher for mothers aged 25-
30  than  for  mothers  aged  31-35.  However,  this  difference  is  not  statistically  significant. 
Indeed,  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  difference  is  zero  is  not  rejected  by  the  Wald  test 
statistic.
16 The marginal effects in Table 7a show to what extent the positive impact of a 
higher education affects the participation and labour supply decisions.
17 Table 7a indicates 
that a higher level of education increases strongly the probability that mothers work full-time 
and slightly the probability to work part-time with a degree of occupation between 50% and 
89%. In addition, it decreases the probability of not working and of working part-time with a 
degree  of  occupation  of  less  than  50%  to  the  same  extent.  As  a  consequence,  a  higher 
education leads essentially to an increase of labour supply.  
 
The results in Table 6  indicate that foreign mothers display  a higher labour force 
attachment than Swiss mothers. Gerfin (1993) finds a similar result in his study on the labour 
supply  of  married  women.  The  financial  difficulties  the  foreign  families  encounter  in 
Switzerland are stronger when a new child is born. Indeed, in foreign households, the man is 
generally less educated and/or has a low level of income, so that a second income is necessary 
in order to maintain a decent standard of living. Childbirth events generate difficulties to 
foreign households, because they have to find a way to combine work and childbearing tasks 
without using the existing nurseries and kindergartens that are costly. The existence of some 
informal care assured by some social networks (extra-family solidarity) can help these foreign 
mothers who want to work. Another reason for the higher labour force attachment observed  
                                                 
16 
2
1 0.36 χ =  and p-value = 0.55. 
17 It is more interesting to know which marginal effects are significant. One way of computing the variances is to 
apply the delta method from the estimated coefficients of Table 6 and derive the asymptotic distribution of the 4 
conditional employment probabilities. However, this technique is rather cumbersome. That is why, I do not 
compute the standard errors of the marginal effects.   37 
Table 7a: Marginal effects
Variables
Reference probabilities 16,65 37,48 25,99 19,87
Socio-demographics
Age (ref: older than 35)
between 25 and 30 0,054 0,023 -0,027 -0,050
between 31 and 35 0,024 0,012 -0,011 -0,024
Marital status
married (ref: non married) 0,138 0,033 -0,068 -0,102
Foreign citizenship 
non Swiss (ref: Swiss) -0,065 -0,056 0,026 0,095
Age and education
25-30 years old and high educated -0,094 -0,097 0,030 0,160
31-35 years old and high educated -0,074 -0,068 0,028 0,114
Household composition
Number and age of existing children (ref: no child*)
First child aged 1-2 0,053 0,023 -0,026 -0,050
First child aged 3-6 0,016 0,009 -0,008 -0,017
First child older than 7 0,072 0,027 -0,036 -0,064
Second and subsequent child aged 1-2 0,085 0,030 -0,042 -0,073
Second and subsequent child aged 3-6 0,204 0,025 -0,099 -0,130
Second and subsequent child older than 7 0,184 0,029 -0,090 -0,122
Regional characteristics
highly urbanised areas (ref: few urbanised) -0,033 -0,020 0,015 0,038
Earnings capacity
partner is highly educated 0,043 0,020 -0,021 -0,042
Interaction terms for the Latin part
partner's education -0,028 -0,244 0,064 0,208
First child aged 1-2 -0,039 -0,247 0,061 0,228
First child aged 3-6 0,089 -0,204 0,061 0,055
First child older than 7 0,103 -0,201 0,057 0,040
Latin part of Switzerland 0,000 -0,231 0,069 0,163
pNW 1 pPT 2 pPT pFT
 
Notes: own calculations. * existing children in the household excluding the recently born child. Effects in italics correspond 
to estimation coefficients that are not significant in Table 6. 
 
for foreign mothers compared to the Swiss mothers is that yearly work permit owners are 
required to exert an activity in order to be able to stay in Switzerland.. 
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Married mothers seem to be more family-oriented. They are indeed less likely to work 
with a higher degree of occupation after childbirth (see the negative marginal effects in Table 
7a). Similarly, having a highly educated partner decreases the mother’s willingness to work. 
Given the fact that I use the partner’s education as a proxy for the partner’s income, this result 
indicates that child rearing is essentially the mother’s responsibility as long as the partner has 
a sufficient income to maintain the household income. A further look at the marginal effects 
in Table 7a indicates that participation and labour supply is lower for married mothers than 
for  mothers  having  a  highly  educated  husband.  Moreover,  the  marginal  effects  on  the 
probability  of  working  full-time  are  less  negative  for  mothers  having  a  highly  educated 
husband than for married mothers. This can be explained by the fact that high-educated men 
are more aware of the difficulty to combine work and family life. They will thus participate in 
childcare and facilitate the mother’s re-entry into the active life. The fact that the repartition 
of care tasks between men and women is more egalitarian has also be obtained for young and 
high-educated households in the studies by Gabadinho (1998) and Höpflinger (2001). 
 
Furthermore, partner’s education appears to have a different effect for the Latin and 
the German regions. In the Latin region, mothers living with a highly educated partner report 
a higher degree of labour force attachment than their counterparts living in the German region 
(see  Table  6).  In  addition,  they  are  more  likely  to  work  full-time  (see  Table  7a).  In  the 
German  part,  however,  mothers  are  more  likely  to  work  part  or  full-time  the  lower  the 
partner’s education is (i.e. the lower the partner’s income is). Thus, it seems that partners 
contribute to childcare and facilitate employment of mothers to a greater extent in the Latin 
region than in the German region. These differences in contribution and facilitation reflect the 
influences of the French and the German culture. These cultural differences have also been 
found in the study by Lauer and Weber (2003) about employment of French and German 
mothers. It is more traditional in Germany to spend more time on childcare tasks than in 
France.  Mühlberger  (2000)  shows  also  that  Germany  belongs  to  the  countries  where  the 
female participation rate decreases at the birth of the first child, because childcare has to be 
provided  by  mothers  due  to  the  lack  of  public  caring  infrastructure.  On  the  contrary,  in 
France, mothers work more often full-time, since the public provision of childcare is well 
developed with for instance the full-day “écoles maternelles”, which are free and run 8 hours 
a day. Switzerland seems to belong to the countries where female participation rate decreases 
after childbirth. However, there are some cultural differences within the country. 
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Table 6 gives further results on the effect of children older than one year. It seems that 
the number and age of children in the household affect the employment decision of mothers 
of  large  families  (having  already  two  children  before  the  birth  of  the  third  child).  These 
mothers are indeed less likely to report work activities one year after the birth of an additional 
child. This is in line with the empirical evidence that the labour force attachment of women is 
negatively correlated with the number of children (see for instance Heckman and Walker, 
1990; Gangadharan and Rosenbloom, 1996). Moreover, the  findings on the effect of  age 
distribution of children are again consistent with the empirical literature. Table 6 indicates 
indeed that the negative effect on labour supply is lower in families with children older than 7 
than in families with children aged 3-6. This is also indicated by the marginal effects in Table 
7a. The marginal effect on full-time probability is more negative for children aged 3-6 than 
for older children. As a consequence, the results on the effect of the number and the age of 
children are in line with the empirical studies about female labour supply: the presence of 
children  has  a  negative  impact  on  the  labour  supply,  but  this  negative  effect  reduces  as 
children become older. 
 
The interaction effects for the regional dummy provide further information. The age of 
the first child has an additional effect on employment of Latin mothers. Table 6 indicates that 
for the age 3-6 a significant effect is found at the 5% level and for the age 1-2, the effect is 
only significant at the 10% level. Ceteris paribus, one year following the birth of her second 
child, a mother living in the Latin region is less willing to work than a mother living in the 
German region, if her first child is aged 3-6. A glance at the marginal effects in Table 7a gives 
further details about the nature of this negative effect. If we add the marginal effects for 
working full-time and part-time with a degree of occupation exceeding 50%, the effect is 
higher than the marginal effect for not working. As a conclusion, one year after childbirth, the 
probability  of  supplying  a  high  number  of  hours  for  mothers  living  in  the  Latin  part  of 
Switzerland  is  higher  than  for  their  counterparts  living  in  the  German  part,  even  in  the 
presence of a young child before the childbirth event occurs.  
 
The hypothesis that larger cities have better childcare facilities than rural areas seems 
to hold for Switzerland. In this study, the highly urbanised areas are defined by cantons of 
ZH, BS and GE. Table 6 shows that the effect of urbanisation degree is significant at the level 
of 10%. The positive effect indicates that mothers living in a large city are more likely to 
work after childbirth. Moreover, the marginal effects in Table 7a shed some lights on the   40 
effect of urbanisation degree on the labour supply. It turns out that mothers living in a highly 
urbanised region are more likely to supply a high number of hours. As a consequence, the 
hypothesis that childcare services are better developed in larger cities is not rejected in this 
study.  
 
Lastly, I discuss the results obtained when regional differences are accounted for. The 
results of the specification tests indicate that the first threshold is common to the regions, 
whereas there is a significant difference between the German and the Latin regions for the 
second and the third thresholds. The marginal effects in Table 7a indicate that ceteris paribus 
German mothers are less likely to supply a high number of hours of work and to work full-
time in the second year after childbirth than Latin mothers. Finally, in order to have more 
details about the labour force  attachment between mothers living in the  Latin and in the 
German region of Switzerland,  I calculate the probabilities for the two reference persons 
having the same characteristics as the above reference person of Table 7a, except that now, I 
explicitly oppose the “Latin” reference person with the “German” reference person (see Table 
7b). The probability of working part-time with a degree of occupation higher than 50% is 
32.9% for Latin mothers against 26% for German mothers; and the probability of working 
full-time is 36% for Latin mothers against 20% for German mothers. Concerning marginal 
effects, they are higher in absolute values for Latin mothers than for German mothers (see 
Appendix A.7). For instance, older and high educated Latin mothers are more likely to work 
full-time than their  German counterparts. This  also holds for  foreign  mothers or mothers 
living in highly urbanised areas. In addition, the marginal effects are negative for part-time 
work with a degree of occupation more than 50% when the reference person is from the Latin 
region, while it is positive when the reference person comes from the German part. As a 
conclusion, Latin mothers are more likely to supply more hours of work in the second year 
following  childbirth  than  German  mothers.  While  the  provision  of  childcare  is  generally 
insufficient in Switzerland, childcare policy in the Latin region seems to be more successful 
in promoting the participation to the labour market and the access to full-time job positions 
than in the German region. In terms of financial measures like family benefits and fiscal 
deductions for children, both regions provide similar help (although there are still cantonal 
differences). However, in terms of measures helping the reconciliation between family and 
work, the analysis in Section 3 shows that the Latin region provides more support. As a 
consequence, the question of harmonisation of family policy at the federal level deserves 
some important attention. Second, the question of providing more support at the federal level   41 
should prove to be useful. These issues are of high importance in the current debate about the 
intervention of the Confederation in the family policy.  
 
Table 7b: Reference persons, difference between the Latin and the German regions
Reference probabilities
German region 16,65 37,48 25,99 19,87
Latin region 16,65 14,34 32,87 36,13
Source: own calculations. 




7  Conclusion 
 
 
The negative relationship between fertility and woman’s labour supply has become a 
policy concern in Switzerland since the 1990s. If measures are not taken, then Switzerland 
will face problems  with an increasing poverty  of families.  In addition, the ageing of the 
population and the continuous decrease of fertility raise some questions about the financial 
viability  of  the  social  protection  system.  It  is  common  knowledge  that  a  well  developed 
childcare policy would raise female labour supply and thus be one solution to the above 
mentioned  problems.  In  Switzerland,  the  general  provision  of  childcare  services  is 
insufficient.  In  addition,  Switzerland  has  no  federal  family  policy.  Instead,  cantons  and 
communes set their objectives in this area. This implies that substantial differences in family 
policy are observed within the country. This is thus interesting to examine in which regions of 
Switzerland, the effect of fertility is the less negative on woman’s labour supply. If there is 
evidence that in some regions mothers are more likely to return to work after childbirth or to 
work full-time than in other regions, then it should be of policy concern to promote a family 
policy at the federal level that provides more support to mothers for the balance of work and 
care activities. 
 
This paper gives a first attempt of investigating the regional differences in the labour 
force attachment of mothers one year after childbirth. In this work, I analyse the disparities 
between the French and Italian (called the “Latin Switzerland”) and the German (called the 
“German Switzerland”)  speaking regions. Besides capturing the linguistic differences, the 
choice  of  this  categorisation  also  reflects  political  and  cultural  differences.  Indeed,  the   42 
political  traditions  are  such  that  the  state  is  more  active  in  the  Latin  region,  while  the 
intervention of the state is limited to the minimum in the German region where the idea of 
independence of communes is deep-seated. In addition, childcare policy in the Latin region 
seems to support more parents in the balance between work and family. For instance, the 
cantons such as Vaud and Ticino have an integrated childcare policy at the cantonal level 
while other cantons such as Zurich and Luzern show no clear engagement at the cantonal 
level. In these latter cantons, communes act at their own discretion.  
 
Motherhood  is  not  considered  to  be  exogenous  in  the  labour  supply.  Instead,  the 
employment  decision  is  simultaneously  modelled  with  the  decision  to  give  birth.  The 
determinants of labour supply are analysed for the sample of mothers, after correcting for 
selectivity  into  motherhood.  The  selectivity  problem  is  solved  by  using  the  technique  of 
instrumental variables.  I use the children’s sex composition as an instrument for fertility. 
Actually, the main limitation of this instrument is that it estimates the effect for moving from 
2 to 3 or more children in the population of women with at least 2 children. However, we 
have not dropped the women with less than 2 children, since they are relevant for the analysis 
of other aspects of the model such as the influence of education and foreign citizenship on the 
labour supply.  
 
The results show that woman’s past wages negatively affect the probability of having 
a child. As a consequence, wages act as an opportunity cost. Another central finding is that 
older highly educated women tend to postpone births. In addition, the probability to have an 
additional child decreases with the number of children. A glance at the time trend reveals that 
over the period of study, women living in the German part of Switzerland are less likely to 
give  a  birth  than  women  from  the  Latin  region.  As  a  consequence,  the  current  Swiss 
institutions and family policy do not help to obtain a sufficiently level of children.  
 
Concerning mothers’ employment, labour market oriented women will return to the 
labour market sooner after childbirth. In addition, the possibility of an alternative income 
source in the household exerts a negative influence on mother’s employment. Due to the lack 
of childcare services in Switzerland, mothers are devoted to care tasks and husbands to work 
activities. However, there is perhaps a new trend that young and higher educated partners will 
contribute more to childcare tasks. Another result indicates that foreign mothers are more 
likely to return to work after childbirth than Swiss mothers are. This is also explained by the   43 
alternative income argument. Given the fact that foreign households face financial constraints, 
the  challenge  that  foreign  mothers  have  to  accept  is  to  work  without  relying  on  costly 
childcare  services.  Concerning  the  age  and  distribution  of  the  children,  the  results  are 
consistent with the empirical finding that the labour supply is negatively influenced by the 
number of children, but as children become older, women return to work. Finally, mothers 
living in a highly urbanised area are more likely to work full-time than mothers living in a 
rural area, since larger cities are better equipped with childcare services than peripheral areas. 
 
Last  results  concern  the  regional  differences.  It  turns  out  that  increasing  partner’s 
income has a negative influence on mother’s labour supply in the German part while it is 
positive in the Latin part. The negative effect for German mothers may be attributed to the 
insufficient provision of childcare structure in the German region. Childcare infrastructure is 
better developed in the Latin part. As a consequence, Latin mothers can still work (full-time) 
after childbirth. This finding is confirmed by the analysis of marginal effects. Ceteris paribus, 
one year after childbirth, Latin mothers are more likely to work full-time than their German 
counterparts. 
 
There is thus evidence that some mothers in Switzerland face barriers in balancing 
work and family. The consequence for the less educated mothers is of particular importance. 
Low educated mothers are a group at risk of staying at the margins of the labour market, 
because  of  the  low  benefit  they  can  expect  from  working  compared  to  the  childcare 
expenditures. Providing measures that help to develop childcare infrastructure should promote 
mothers  to  a  better  social  position  where  their  labour  market  skills  are  maintained,  their 
personal aspirations about work are enhanced and their access to full-time jobs is facilitated. 
The fact that German mothers face more difficulties in balancing work and family than Latin 
mothers  reveals  a  lack  of  coherence  in  the  Swiss  family  policy.  This  raises  the  question 
whether childcare policy should be instituted at the federal level. Finally, a well developed 
family policy does not only increase full-time employment, but it ensures a higher fertility 
rate. 
 
An interesting extension of this analysis would be to compare the results found when 
communes are accounted for in the empirical analysis. The communal level has been indeed 
ignored in this study. However, communes are important actors in childcare policy, especially 
in the German speaking region of Switzerland. Another worthwhile extension would be to   44 
investigate the role of political actors. Finally, the main limitation of the instrument used in 
this study is that the estimation results do not necessarily describe the fertility movements 
from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 2 children. However, I find that the birth of the third child decreases 
labour supply. Since, there is empirical evidence that the marginal effect of the second child 
and of the subsequent children is more negative than that of the first child, the results of this 
analysis may have implications for women with less than 2 children.   45 
Appendices 
Appendix A.1: Participation and fertility rates 
Evolution of participation rate for women between 15-64 




Source: Report on families (2004), fertility rate (y axis) ; participation rate (x axis) 
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Source: own calculations from SLFS 2003. Women, 25-55.   46 
Appendix A.3: the treatment of unobserved wages 
The problem of unobserved wages is solved by replacing the actual observed wage by 
the expected wage that is obtained by estimating a selectivity-corrected wage equation on 
workers  by  OLS.  The  wage  equation  is  identified  from  the  inclusion  of  regional 
characteristics (dummies for 6 regions, dummies for living in a big city and in a rural area) as 
well as socio-demographic characteristics (age, education and foreign citizenship).
18 In the 
selection equation, the probit-participation used to compute the inverse Mills ratio includes in 
addition to the above mentioned variables controls for marital and family status. These latter 
variables are considered to be instruments, because they influence the working decision and 
not the hourly wage rate. It is further assumed that the hourly wage rate is not influenced by 
the number of hours worked. To allow for a non-linear influence of education, two dummies 
for secondary and tertiary level are included as well as interaction terms involving quadratics 
and logarithms by combining age and education dummies.  
 
The estimation results of the wage and probit-selection equations are presented below 
(Table A.3). The results are consistent with those usually found in the labour supply studies. 
Wages increase with age, with a concave age pattern. According to the product terms, the 
importance of age increases with education level. If woman has a foreign citizenship, it is 
estimated that she will receive lower wages. Finally, living in a large city has a positive effect 
on wages relative to living in a rural region. Turning to the selection equation, being married 
and having children, especially younger than 6, reduces the probability of working. A last 
result concerns the error term structure in this 2-step procedure. It turns out that the error 
terms in the selection and in the regression equations are significantly negatively correlated. 
This suggests that the wages for women who actually participate are significantly lower than 
the wages that the non working women would obtain on the labour market. 
 
                                                 
18 regional dummies are for Région Lémanique, Zurich, Nothwestern, Eastern, Central and Ticino (reference 
category is Espace Mitteland). The city size dummies are: living in a big city (more than 100’000 inhabitants), in 
a rural area (fewer than 10’000 inhabitants) and in a small city (reference category). For foreign citizenship, 2 
dummies for B and C work permit are specified.   47 
Table A.3: Wage and selection equations 
Variables
Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err.
Socio-demographics
secondary level of education 0,146 0,127 -0,850 0,248
tertiary level of education -0,434 0,153 -1,174 0,331
log of age 3,292 0,380 13,267 0,890
log of age squared -0,431 0,052 -1,929 0,121
secondary level of education*age 0,021 0,034 0,281 0,067
tertiary level of education*age 0,247 0,041 0,445 0,090
foreigner with a B work permit -0,065 0,018 -0,168 0,036
foreigner with a C work permit -0,078 0,008 0,151 0,017
Regional characteristics
Living in a rural area -0,090 0,010 -0,062 0,020
Living in a large city 0,087 0,008 -0,028 0,017
Région Lémanique 0,054 0,008 -0,135 0,016
Zurich 0,029 0,011 0,046 0,024
North Western 0,011 0,009 -0,066 0,020
Eastern 0,022 0,203 -0,010 0,019
Central 0,036 0,010 -0,080 0,020
Ticino 0,083 0,016 -0,244 0,031
Household composition
Married -0,453 0,119
Number of children -0,133 0,059
Youngest child is less than 6 -0,347 0,149
Constant -3,262 0,701 -2,857 0,630
Mills ratio -0,121 0,011
Std.dev. of error term in wage equation 0,505 0,095
Log-wage equation Selection equation
 
Notes: own calculations (70381 observations, 21685 persons), LR test for  0 ρ =  rejected at 5%. 
 Source: SLFS 1991-2003.  
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Appendix A.4: Explanatory variables used in the analysis 
Variables Descritption
Socio-demographics
Age 4 categories: between 25 and 29, between 30 and 34, between 35 and 39
 and older than 40.
Marital status 2 categories: married and not married
2 categories: living without a partner and with a partner
Level of education  3 categories: primary (without education, primary school), secondary 
(elementary professional training, apprenticeship, full-time professional 
school, general knowledge school, university entrance qualification),
 tertiary (professional training with master degree, technical and high
 professional school, university, high school).
Foreign citizenship 2 categories: non Swiss and Swiss.
Household composition
Children* Number of children (from 0 to 4).
Age of children 3 dummies if the youngest child is between 0 and 2; 3 and 6; older than 6.
Gender of children 3 variables: dummy if the first child is a boy; dummy if the second child 
is a boy; dummy if the first two children are of the same sex.
Regional characteristics
Region of residence** 7 categories: Ostschweiz, Zentralschweiz, Région Lémanique, Ticino, 
Nordschweiz, Espace Mitteland, and Zurich.
Urbanisation degree 2 categories: highly urbanised region (ZH, BS and GE), few urbanised 
(other cantons).
Cantonal birth rate Cantonal birth rate from the Federal Statistical Office°
Cantonal vacancy/unempl. rate Cantonal vacancy/unemployment rate from the Seco°°
Earnings capacity
Own earnings Before tax wage rate in logs.
Partner’s education level Dummy if there is a well-educated partner (of tertiary level).
Partner’s age Age of the partner.
Macroeconomic effects Time trend and time trend squared
 
Notes: * For the fertility equation, interaction terms between the number and age of the children are used. For the  
employment equation, the number and age of children is defined for the children already living in the household  
(excluding the newly born child); ** Ostschweiz (East: Schaffhausen, Turgau, Appenzell R, Appenzell I, St.Gal- 
Zentralschweiz (Center: Luzern, Obwalden, Nidwalden, Uri, Schwyz, Zug), Région Lémanique (South West:  
Geneva, Vaud, Valais), Nordwestschweiz (North West: Aargau, Basel Land, Basel City), Espace Mittelland ( 
 (West: Jura, Neuchâtel, Fribourg, Bern, Solothurn); ° Section Démographie et Migration (DEM); °° State  
Secretariat of Economic Affairs of the Swiss Government (Seco). 
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Appendix A.5: Derivation of the likelihood function 
Here,  we  write  the  contributions  to  the  likelihood  function.  There  are  5  events  that  are 
determinant.  
The first event concerns women who do not give birth. This event occurs with the following 
probability: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* 0 0 i i i i i i i P F P F P u Z P u Z Z γ γ γ = = > = > − = < = Φ . 
 
The other events relate to women who become mothers. In this case, we define 4 events 
according  to  the  labour  force  state  the  woman  occupies  one  year  after  childbirth.  The 
probability to report NW  is expressed in the following way: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* *
1 1 2 1 1, 1 0, , , , i i i i i i i i i i P F A P F A P u Z e X Z X µ γ µ β γ µ β ρ = = = ≤ ≤ = ≤ − ≤ − = Φ − − . 
Similarly, we obtain the following probabilities for the other labour force states: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* * * * * *
1 2 2 1
2 1
2 2 2 1
1, 2 0, 0, 0,
                           , ,
                           , , , ,
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i
P F A P F A P F A P F A
P u Z e X P u Z e X
Z X Z X
µ µ µ µ
γ µ β γ µ β
γ µ β ρ γ µ β ρ
= = = ≤ ≤ ≤ = ≤ ≤ − ≤ ≤
= ≤ − ≤ − − ≤ − ≤ −
= Φ − − −Φ − −
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* *
2 3 2 3 2 2 1, 3 0, , , , , i i i i i i i i P F A P F A Z X Z X µ µ γ µ β ρ γ µ β ρ = = = ≤ ≤ ≤ = Φ − − −Φ − −  
and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* * * * *
3 3
2 3
1, 4 0, 0 0,
                          , ,
i i i i i i i
i i i
P F A P F A P F P F A
Z Z X
µ µ
γ γ µ β ρ
= = = ≤ > = ≤ − ≤ ≤
= Φ − −Φ − −
 
(see the graph below) 
The contribution to the likelihood of woman i is thus: 






i i i F F A j
i i i i
j
L P F P F A j
− =
=
= = = = ∏ . 
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Appendix A.6: Specification tests  
For birth decision
Individual tests Dof Value of  (p-value)
Tests on coefficients
Age dummies 3 143.47 (0.00)
No partner 1 132.77 (0.00)
Education dummies 2 10.43 (0.01)
Age and education interaction dummies 3 8.15 (0.04)
Foreign citizenship 1 0.11 (0.74)
Number and age of children 9 281.58 (0.00)
Gender of children 3 7.19 (0.07)
   Boy dummies  2 0.23 (0.89)
   First two children of the same sex 1 7.11 (0.01)
Region of residence 6 12.77 (0.04)
Dummy for highly urbanised cantons 1 1.93 (0.16)
Cantonal birth rate 1 0.01 (0.93)
Cantonal vacancy/unemployment rate 1 0.04 (0.85)
Own previous earnings 1 8.27 (0.00)
Partner’s education 1 8.46 (0.00)
Tests on interaction terms for Latin part
Age dummies 3 1.87 (0.60)
No partner 1 0.71 (0.39)
Education dummies 2 1.71 (0.42)
Age*high education 3 2.02 (0.57)
Foreign citizenship 1 0.01 (0.99)
Number and age of children 9 9.02 (0.34)
Gender of children 3 2.08 (0.55)
Dummy for highly urbanised cantons 1 0.14 (0.71)
Cantonal birth rate 1 0.73 (0.39)
Cantonal vacancy/unemployment rate 1 0.14 (0.71)
Own previous earnings 1 0.32 (0.57)
Partner’s education 1 2.01 (0.16)
Tests on intercept
Latin = German 1 0.30 (0.59)
Test on trend
Latin = German for trend 1 16.44 (0.00)
Latin = German for trend squared 1 10.21 (0.00)
Global Wald test for final specification 30 1269.72 (0.00)
2 χ
 
Notes: own computations. 
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Appendix A.6: Specification tests (... continued) 
For employment decision
Individual tests Dof Value of  (p-value)
Tests on coefficients
Age dummies 2 5.25 (0.07)
Married 1 12.65 (0.00)
Education dummies 2 0.05 (0.97)
Age and education interaction dummies 2 5.30 (0.07)
Foreign citizenship 1 8.06 (0.00)
Number and age of children 6 29.88 (0.00)
   Age  for 1 already born child 3 14.82 (0.00)
   Age for more than 1 child 3 27.25 (0.00)
Dummy for highly urbanised cantons 1 3.97 (0.05)
Cantonal vacancy/unemployment rate 1 0.81 (0.37)
Own previous earnings 1 0.09 (0.76)
Trend and trend squared 2 0.70 (0.70)
Partner’s education 1 4.52 (0.03)
Tests on interaction terms for Latin part
Age dummies 2 0.35 (0.84)
Married 1 0.23 (0.63)
Education dummies 2 1.16 (0.56)
Age and education interaction dummies 2 0.84 (0.66)
Foreign citizenship 1 1.16 (0.28)
Number and age of children 6 9.53 (0.14)
   Age  for 1 already born child 3 8.98 (0.03)
   Age for more than 1 child 3 1.26 (0.74)
Dummy for highly urbanised cantons 1 0.74 (0.39)
Cantonal vacancy/unemployment rate 1 0.01 (0.94)
Own previous earnings 1 2.17 (0.14)
Trend and trend squared 2 0.07 (0.97)
Partner’s education 1 4.87 (0.03)
Tests on thresholds
Latin = German for the 1st threshold 1 0.11 (0.74)
Latin = German for the 2nd threshold 1 27.35 (0.00)
Latin = German for the 3rd threshold 1 13.21 (0.00)
2 χ
 
Notes: own computations 
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Appendix A.7: Marginal effects, difference between the Latin and the German region 
Variables
Reference probabilities 16,65 37,48 25,99 19,87 16,65 14,34 32,87 36,13
Socio-demographics
Age (ref: older than 35)
between 25 and 30 0,054 0,023 -0,027 -0,050 0,054 0,019 -0,002 -0,071
between 31 and 35 0,024 0,012 -0,011 -0,024 0,024 0,009 0,007 -0,033
Marital status
married (ref: non married) 0,138 0,033 -0,068 -0,102 0,138 0,036 -0,021 -0,152
Foreign citizenship 
non Swiss (ref: Swiss) -0,065 -0,056 0,026 0,095 -0,065 -0,033 -0,020 0,118
Age and education
25-30 years old and high educated -0,094 -0,097 0,030 0,160 -0,094 -0,053 -0,044 0,191
31-35 years old and high educated -0,074 -0,068 0,028 0,114 -0,074 -0,039 -0,026 0,140
Household composition
Number and age of existing children (ref: no child)
Second and subsequent child aged 1-2 0,085 0,030 -0,042 -0,073 0,085 0,027 -0,007 -0,105
Second and subsequent child aged 3-6 0,204 0,025 -0,099 -0,130 0,204 0,042 -0,045 -0,201
Second and subsequent child older than 7 0,184 0,029 -0,090 -0,122 0,184 0,041 -0,038 -0,188
Regional characteristics
highly urbanised areas (ref: few urbanised) -0,033 -0,020 0,015 0,038 -0,033 -0,014 -0,035 0,051
Earnings capacity
partner is highly educated 0,043 0,020 -0,021 -0,042 -0,028 -0,013 -0,005 0,045
Source: own calculations. Effects in italics correspond to estimation coefficients that are not significant in Table 6.
German region Latin region
pNW 1 pPT 2 pPT pFT pNW 1 pPT 2 pPT pFT
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